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Abstract
During the last two decades, a dramatic transition from authori-
tarianism to a rapid process of democratization has been experi-
enced by many different societies across the world. In Indonesia, 
reformasi 1998 has not only been followed by a massive transfor-
mation in many different dimensions but also the changing char-
acter of interdependently hybrid governance arrangements which 
lead to an ‘authoritarian turn’, particularly concerning about the 
visions of social harmony within a post-democratization context 
that is impacted by religious violent extremism. As such extremism 
is experienced daily in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world, while 
there is an absence of effective state interventions or at least the 
fact that state is no longer perceived as the principle referent for 
security, there has been an exceptional trend of what I call ‘ref-or-
mas-i’. It indicates how non-state actors, more specifically Ormas 
(mass organizations) is taking the shape of providing people’s ba-
sic needs, professing security, promoting inter-religious tolerance, 
and even campaigning nationalism in the local, national, and glob-
al communities. This phenomenon certainly raises a question of 
how the non-state actors organize their role ‘acting like a state’ in 
society to produce new forms of ‘imagined communities’. Based on 
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ethnographic fieldwork in two different Indonesian urban settings 
in Surabaya and Yogyakarta, this paper focuses on elaborating 
the roles of two different moderate Islamic groups, Banser and Ja-
maah Maiyah, more specifically on the discourses they use and the 
empirical actions they perform in securing the local community, 
defending the national ideology, and idealizing the global harmony 
through different interpretation of jihad and different approach of 
engagement in the society, more specifically for responding wide-
spread religious extremism.
Selama dua dekade terakhir, transisi dramatis dari otoritarian-
isme ke proses demokratisasi yang cepat telah dialami oleh ban-
yak masyarakat yang berbeda di seluruh dunia. Di Indonesia, 
reformasi 1998 tidak hanya diikuti oleh transformasi besar-besa-
ran dalam banyak dimensi yang berbeda, tetapi juga perubahan 
karakter pengaturan tata kelola hibrida yang saling bergantung 
dan mengarah pada ‘pergantian otoriter’, khususnya mengenai visi 
harmoni sosial dalam sebuah konteks pasca demokratisasi yang 
dipengaruhi oleh ekstremisme agama. Karena ekstremisme seperti 
itu dialami setiap hari di Indonesia dan di tempat lain di dun-
ia, sementara tidak ada intervensi negara yang efektif atau seti-
daknya fakta bahwa negara tidak lagi dianggap sebagai rujukan 
prinsip untuk keamanan, telah ada tren luar biasa dari apa yang 
saya sebut ‘ref-ormas-i’. Ini menunjukkan bagaimana aktor-aktor 
non-negara, lebih khusus ormas (organisasi kemasyarakatan) men-
gambil bentuk menyediakan kebutuhan dasar masyarakat, men-
yatakan keamanan, mempromosikan toleransi antaragama, dan 
bahkan mengkampanyekan nasionalisme di komunitas lokal, na-
sional, dan global. Fenomena ini tentu menimbulkan pertanyaan 
tentang bagaimana aktor non-negara mengatur peran mereka ‘ber-
tindak seperti negara’ dalam masyarakat untuk menghasilkan ben-
tuk baru ‘masyarakat yang dibayangkan’. Berdasarkan penelitian 
lapangan etnografi di dua kota di Indonesia, Surabaya dan Yogya-
karta, makalah ini berfokus pada elaborasi peran dua kelompok 
Islam moderat yang berbeda, Banser dan Jamaah Maiyah. Lebih 
khusus penelitian ini mengamati wacana yang mereka gunakan 
dan tindakan empiris yang mereka lakukan dalam mengamankan 
komunitas lokal, mempertahankan ideologi nasional, dan men-
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gidealisasikan keharmonisan global melalui interpretasi jihad dan 
pendekatan yang berbeda dalam masyarakat, terutama dalam 
menanggapi ekstremisme agama yang tersebar luas.
Keywords:  banser; democratic transition; jamaah maiyah; jihad; 
new imagined communities; non-state actors.
Introduction
“In Indonesia, religion seems to be a safe base for people to 
fall back on. People faced with pressing difficulties tend to 
seek security in their religion by relying more on their religious 
community, taking God more seriously and relearning their 
prayers. However, religion is not only a means of rescue in the 
private domain. Social problems and political troubles are of-
ten seen in relation to religious life” (Kleden 2003).
Kleden’s premise seems to have a lot of empirical relevan-
ce considering that Indonesia is among the top three of the most 
religious countries in the world, after Bangladesh and Ethiopia, 
compared to the least religious countries of China, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom (Gilani, Johnny, and Carballo 2018). Why 
is Indonesia so religious? Why is there such a high degree of 
religious extremists and religious related violent conflicts within 
religious communities in Indonesia, as compared to the other 
two most religious countries? Answering to these questions may 
need a comprehensive analysis on many different spectrums of 
Indonesian religious life because religion is complex and diverse, 
a multi-faceted phenomenon, including cognition, behavior, 
experience and more (Watts and Bretherton 2017). 
Among many different definitions of extremism, Wildman 
(2011) suggests that extremism as “ideological beliefs and 
behaviors well beyond the boundaries of the ‘normal’ in a 
political, cultural, religious, or moral context”, thus religious 
extremism can be seen as “…simply extremism when ideological 
beliefs are religious in nature and ideological behaviors 
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are religiously motivated and rationalized”. In this sense, 
understanding all aspects of religious extremism should be based 
on multiple dimensional perspectives, because historically and 
ethnographically studied from particular conflict situations have 
always shown that today’s “moderates” become tomorrow’s 
“radicals” and vice versa (Mietzner 2002). 
The newest case of multiple suicide bombings killed 
hundreds people on Easter Sunday 2019 in Srilanka carried out 
by mostly educated and middle-class backgrounds provides a 
clear example. Other incidents of the brutal mosques shooting 
in Christchurch, New Zealand done by a ‘normal’ young 
man, the suicide bombings at three churches in Surabaya by a 
single ‘ordinary’ family of six in May 2018, or the earlier case 
of Triyono Ut‎omo Abdul Bakti, an ex-government officer at 
the Ministry of Finance who held a Master’s degree from the 
University of Adelaide, Australia and brought his family to join 
ISIS in Syria but then deported by Turkish authorities in 2017, 
and also the case of Fadlullah Hasan (a Bali bomber 2012 and a 
close friend of Noor Huda Ismail, a journalist and anti-terrorist 
activist), are just fiew examples illustrating how ordinary citizens 
easily turned out towards the circles of extreme violent religious 
extremism. 
In the context of Indonesia, due to the fact that post-
authoritarian era has not only been characterized by series of 
ethnic and religious conflicts, but also with multiple globally 
recognized terrorist attacks and undeniable cases of identified 
Indonesian Muslim jihadists joining ISIS.2 This local-global 
connectedness of religious extremism creates the story of 
security discourses and practices for what Abrahamsen and 
Williams (2009, 3) describe as ‘global security assemblages’, 
2 Setyo Wasisto, the head of Public Relation of the National Police revealed to 
KOMPAS, September 20, 2017 that there were 671 Indonesian Muslims (including 147 
women) identified to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq. 
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which are defined as “settings where a range of different global 
and local, public and private security agents and normativity 
interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, 
practices, and forms of security governance”. This perspective 
is crucial in the sense that the 9/11 tragedy, which is seemed to 
bring about a public consensus that “everything had changed” 
(Lipschutz 2009) for the global security sphere. In this respect, 
it is impossible for state actors to provide all security solutions 
without active roles being played by non-state actors, more 
specifically given the fact that Indonesian security spaces are 
defined by contestation (Wilson 2017), rather than by effective 
state’s rule of law. 
Geertz (1996), for example, illustrates this complication with 
an idea of “religion as a cultural system”. This has complicated 
symbolic interpretations, in the sense that symbols can help 
people feel safe and comfortable, but at the same time also trigger 
memories of trauma (Schirch 2015). While, Hefner (2013) comes 
up with the idea that religion in Indonesia has highly influenced by 
what he calls the “zig-zag shifts of the country’s politics”. Within 
these considerations, it is important to note that Indonesian 
society has experienced hundreds of years of pressing difficulties 
under the Dutch colonial rule, years of turmoil in the political 
situation between communists, nationalists, and religious groups 
during the Old Order regime, three decades of the pressure of 
dictatorship during the New Order era, and the bloody May 
1998 reform tragedy that paved new democratic transition. The 
Indonesian post-authoritarian era provides a good illustration 
of a rapid process of democratization marked with increasing 
proliferation of massive ethnic-religious violent incidents and 
conflicts. This has led to the emergence and the development 
of a wide variety of non-state actors, more specifically religious 
militia and civil vigilante groups claiming public authority 
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through the provision of security services as a public good (Bak-
ker 2015; Telle 2013; Wilson 2017). 
Then, the democratic transition has also brought a dilemmatic 
situation to the state security forces (TNI and POLRI) because on 
the one side they had lost credibility in providing security due to 
a long history of becoming more of a political institution rather 
than a defense force. On the other side, they had to struggle 
with new security threats (extremist groups and terrorists), due 
to the fact that Indonesia is considered as both a battlefield of a 
global terrorist movement, and as a “producer” of terrorists. As 
a result, after two decades of post-authoritarian rule, Indonesia 
has not only been characterized as a ‘contested arena’ of (un)
civil society and political change (Beittinger-Lee 2010) and as a 
‘contest state’ of institutional configuration of power (Nordholt 
2016), but also as a contested security space derived from the 
everyday politics of Indonesian people’s lives (Wilson 2017). In 
many cases, as Bakker (2015) has noted, the national military 
force and police usually play minor roles in preventing or putting 
down regional violence, so that local inhabitants must come up 
with their own solutions and strategies to cure the development 
and settlement of religious related violent incidents and conflicts.
In responding to the absence of effective state interventions, 
there has been a dramatically growing number of social and 
religious movements performing their own initiatives that are 
more globally recognized in deploying defense, policing people, 
offering governance and development activities to counter 
extremist violence (Denney 2012; Krause 2013). According to 
Bayat (2005), the defining feature of a social movement is a 
unity of purpose and action, where “shared interests and values 
are invariably proposed to account for the elements which 
bring actors together for a united purpose”. When these kinds 
of united purposes are very diverse, as reflected in post-reform 
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Indonesian society and elsewhere in the world, even though 
the movements are coming from similar Islamic ideologically 
driven backgrounds, those who do extraordinary things will 
get more attention, and that is what has been done by the 
religious extremist groups. Obtaining greater attention means 
an escalating chance of getting larger numbers of sympathizers 
and followers. 
Among many different religious groups, Banser and 
Jamaah Maiyah are moderate Muslim groups that have been 
extraordinarily shown their empirical engagements in securing the 
local community, defending the national ideology, and idealizing 
and promoting the global harmony, particularly through different 
interpretation of jihad and different approach of engagement 
in the society for responding wide-spread religious extremism. 
These two different groups, with different orientations, help 
explain what Hefner (2013) has emphasized that Indonesia’s 
Islamic reform movement has played an exceptional role in 
challenging stereotypes of Islam as antagonistic to democracy 
and rejecting the goal of an Islamic state, as well as promoting 
democratic ideals and women’s rights, and mobilizing religiously 
ecumenical support. 
Banser and Jamaah Maiyah: Singing to a Similar Rhyme, Danc-
ing to a Different Drum
Banser, of which Beittinger-Lee (2010, 159) has difficulty 
in classifying this group into what she calls “Uncivil Society 
Organizations” (USOs), is a Muslim paramilitary group with a 
long historical root in the Islamic movement as well as Indonesian 
independence movement. It belongs to Gerakan Pemuda (GP) 
Ansor (Ansor youth movement), a youth wing of the Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU, the biggest Indonesian Muslim organization 
established in 1926 in Surabaya, East Java by a charismatic 
moderate Muslim ulama named K.H.  Hasyim Asy‘ari as a 
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response to the rise of Wahabism in the Arabs). The name Banser 
comes from an Indonesian acronym of Barisan Ansor Serbaguna 
(Ansor’s multipurpose troops). Barisan (n) literally means front, 
troops, squad; while Ansor (n) means “helper”, welcomer, host; 
and Serbaguna (adj) means multipurpose, versatile. 
Anam (1996) notes that the initial name of GP Ansor was 
Anshoru Nahdlatul Oelama (ANO), established during the 9th 
NU Congress in Banyuwangi, East Java on April 24, 1934, the 
offcial date of birth of GP which has just celebrated 85 years 
of anniversary). During the second congress of ANO in 1937, 
initiated by KH. Abdul Wahab, ANO created Barisan Ansor 
Nahdlatul Oelama (BANOE), consisting of a youth group of 
civil militias, as part of NU’s contribution to the process of 
the independence revolution movement against Dutch colonial 
rule, which was then also strengthened with Resolusi Jihad 
Fī Sabīlillāh (NU’s jihad resolution) on October 22, 1945 in 
Surabaya. The first commander of BANOE was Syamsul Islam, 
who was also the chairman of the ANO Malang (East Java) 
chapter under the advisory of the Indonesia National Armed 
Forces (TNI) commander Hamid Rusydi. The name of ANO 
was then transformed into GP Ansor on December 14, 1949, 
and this name still exists today. Since its initial establishment, 
BANOE has had a very close relation with TNI. This is not only 
because the group played a key role in supporting TNI during 
the independence revolution, but also as a matter of fact that its 
total members compared to the number TNI personnel (5 million 
of Banser members vs less than 1 million personnel of TNI). In 
the beginning of 1960s, as a response to frequent confrontations 
with the PKI (the left-wing party) and its affiliated organization 
of Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Front), the name 
Banser was officially used, and Mohammad Zainuddin Kayubi 
was appointed to be the first commander. The tension between 
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NU and PKI reached its height during the mass killings of 1965–
1966 against the recognized members of PKI. TNI and Banser 
played major roles in this moment of historical violence (La Botz 
2001, 248).
Throughout Suharto’s New Order era, the relation between 
Banser and the state was up and down, even though there was no 
serious confrontation. Banser was mainly used for the political 
purposes of NU under the vehicle of the United Development 
Party (PPP), the opponent of Golkar’s government party. During 
the era of early 1980s (in the 1983 NU’s national meeting in 
Situbondo, East Java), NU decided to withdraw from its political 
activities and moved ‘back to khittah’ or back to the original 1926 
fundamentals of socio-religious concerns, with a commitment to 
support the national ideology of Pancasila. Since then, as Banser 
has become a more autonomous organization without direct 
orders from NU as it previously had. Then, it has become a main 
collaborator with TNI for a wide range of military trainings 
and security activities (Salim 2004). Banser has memoranda of 
understandings (MoU’s) to strengthen its authority, not only 
with TNI, but also with Konperensi Waligereja Indonesia/KWI 
(Bishops’ Conference of Indonesia) and other state and non-
state elements, to mobilize massive armed forces for security 
purposes, as well as social, political, and business-related goals, 
and more importantly for fighting against other Islamic groups 
trying to replace the national ideology of Pancasila.
Ontologically, based on an interview with senior member 
of GP Ansor in East Java, the spirit of the GP Ansor religious 
movement was inspired by the moment of hijrah (migration) 
of the prophet Muhammad in Islamic history. The word ansor 
refers to a group of local inhabitants of the city of Medina who 
welcomed and provided shelter, foods, and other needs of the 
immigrants from Mecca (known as muhājirīn) who followed the 
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migration of the prophet. By using Banser as the core cadre of 
GP Ansor, it has an idealization of what it is commonly perceived 
in Indonesia as Masyarakat Madani (the word madani comes 
from Medina, civil society based on the revitalization of Islamic 
values and local tradition by the prophet in the city of Medina). 
As symbolized in the logo of Banser, the pentagonal shape 
indicates the five pillars of Islam and Pancasila as the five pillars 
of Indonesian state. The bird’s wings refer to Abābīl (the bird of 
Mecca), a miraculous bird (identified as swallows) mentioned in 
the Quran that protected the Ka’ba in Mecca from the Aksumite 
elephant army of Abraha in the year of 570. The Arabic words 
of nahnu anshārullāh mean “we are the saviors” or “we are the 
rescuers”, indicating a commitment to ‘protect’, or to ‘ensure 
security’. A symbol of the “fighting knife” represents “readiness 
for fighting” and explicitly promotes physical power and violence 
as the main tools of Banser for its security provision. 
Figure 1 
Official Symbol of Banser
Source: nu.or.id, 2019
As a state registered legal mass organization under Indonesian 
Ormas Law, Banser has many different sources of funding, but 
mostly gathered from NU-affiliated crowdfunding resources. 
For social purposes, they are securing religious events, provide 
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personnel for disaster related incidents, and work together 
with police and military forces during social conflicts or mass 
violence. The membership consists of predominantly the low 
income and low educated population coming from rural areas, 
such as: agricultural workers, peasants, truck and ojek drivers, 
and other informal workers, while a large number of them are 
unemployed citizens. Currently, there are also a growing number 
of educated people joining this group with a wide variety of 
reasons. Among these population, Rudiyanto (pseudonym), a 
university graduate from Surabaya represents common reason 
by revealing;
“I am interested in joining Banser simply because it has been 
consistently standing in the forefront of struggles against any 
groups trying to replace Pancasila with other national ideolo-
gy…I was personally called to protect NKRI (the Unitary Re-
public of Indonesia), as mandated by ulama and the founding 
fathers of Indonesia, without expecting material rewards” (in-
terview with Rudiyanto, November 10, 2018). 
Interestingly, it is very common for the new members of 
Banser to use their own money to buy a military-like uniform 
which is required to be used for all its related activities. In many 
cases, they have to borrow money from their relatives or friends 
in order to make sure that they can be immediately on duty 
right after finishing Banser’s basic training. In operationalizing 
its religious movement, Banser has at least eight divisions, with 
each own different role, as listed in table 1 below.
Table 1  
Divisions of Banser 
No. Name of Divisions Main Function
1. Densus 99 (Detasemen Khusus 
99 Asmaul Husana): Special 
detachment 99
security guards for religious and social 
activities
2. Bagana (Banser Tanggap 
Bencana): Disaster response unit
disaster prevention, emergency 
response and rehabilitation.
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3. Balakar (Banser Penanggulangan 
Kebakaran): Firefighters’ unit
prevention of fire hazards, emergency 
response, and rehabilitation
4. Balantas (Banser Lalu Lintas): 
Traffic force
traffic handling, and transportation 
issues, as well as reducing accident 
risk
5. Basada (Banser Husada): 
Health aid troops
humanitarian assistance medical 
issues, health, and promoting healthy 
living norms for society
6. Protokoler (Banser Protokoler) 
Official Strikebreaking force
State-related event management, 
official NU organizations or events
7. Baritim (Banser Maritim): Navy 
troops
safeguarding, preserving, and 
conserving the maritime region
8. CPB (Corp Provost Banser): 
Elite corps
observing, supervising, controlling, 
cracking down, evaluating and 
punishing forces within the internal 
organization
Source: Juklak Banser (Banser’s guide book), Satkornas (National 
coordinating board), 2017.
Nowadays, with an estimated membership reaches more 
than 5 million squads nationally, three to five times bigger 
than the total number of TNI personnel (Indonesian state 
armed force) and POLRI (the national police) combined (even 
the national office of GP Ansor has no actual data on the real 
number of Banser members), Banser has even more roles than 
its original goals at its establishment. In many regions, especially 
in East Java, it has shown more progressive roles and initiatives 
in response to the issue of radicalism and terrorism, including 
persistent confrontations with radical Islam groups. The case of 
Riyanto, a heroic Banser member, who sacrificed himself and 
died in a Christmas Eve bomb blast in 2000 in Mojokerto (East 
Java) protecting many Christians’ lives, was also an example 
of how first-hand and immediate security in the field can be 
performed by Banser at any given period of time or location 
throughout the country. Kastkorcab (city commander) of Banser 
in Surabaya revealed that he has serious and long process of 
investigation as a witness of the 2018 surabaya bombings, a 
series of attacts occurred on May 13 in three churches. 
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“…it is actually draining my mind and energy, but after all, 
I have to help protect my city and my country from terrorist 
threats and those who claim jihad to replace Pancasila with 
khilafah” (interview with Kasatkorcab Banser Surabaya, No-
vember 15, 2018).
Last year, the incident of alleged HTI’s flag burning by 
Banser members in West Java last year, which raised national 
controversy, showed how this group tried to convince public 
that they are really on the front row for “fighting” against 
what they call the suporters of khilafahism. For the last couple 
of years, dozens of international branches of NU around the 
world have been trying to established GP Ansor and Banser 
to support their global engagemant in countering religious 
extremism. International basic trainings of Banser have also 
been successfully organized in five different countries, which are 
Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Egypt with 
high enthusiasm.  
Jamaah Maiyah. Literally, Jamaah (Arabic: jamāʿah) means 
doing things together, but the Indonesian translation has slightly 
different meanings: Jamak (adj) means plural, more than one; 
jamaah (n) means group of people, ber-jamaah (v) means get 
together or in congregation; and Maiyah (Arabic: māʿa) means 
with-, māʿana means with us; māʿallah means with Allah/God; 
Maiyah can be interpreted as togetherness, because it has no 
Indonesian term. Semantically, it has underlying cognition 
of the concept of Maiyah, which refers to a powerful sense 
of communion and togetherness (Daniels 2009, 136). It was 
originally a small traditional monthly pengajian (religious 
gathering) initiated in October 1993 by Emha Ainun Nadjib 
(Cak Nun) and his family, named Padhangbulan (full moon) as 
it is usually held on the 15th of the Islamic calendar (the middle 
of the month), in Jombang, East Java, which led to regular 
gatherings in many different places with each local name. 
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Kamba (2015) pointed out that the term Maiyah is also 
based on the sayings of Prophet Muhammad to his friend 
Abu Bakar in the cave of Tsur during the moment of Hijrah 
(migration from Mecca to Medina), when they were surrounded 
by their enemies: “…lā tahzan, innallāha ma’anā…” (‘Don’t be 
sad, indeed Allah is with us’, and Allah sent down his tranquility 
upon him and supported him with angels you did not see …” 
(al-Quran, al-Taubah 9:40). In this case, Betts (2006) has called 
Maiyah the jalan sunyi Emha (the silent pilgrimage of Emha) 
to illustrate how the group is looking for a new pathway as 
a socio-cultural as well as religious movement. The moving 
(migration, transformation) is what is important from the 
moment of Hijrah in Islam, as Maiyah also uses its spirit, rather 
than the moment of the date of birth of the prophet. That is 
why Islamic calendar is started from this moment (unlike the 
calendar in Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and others that 
use the birthday or the death day of founders). Kamba (2018) 
also argues that Maiyah is jalan kenabian (a prophetic pathway) 
based on five main principles: kemandirian (sovereignty), 
kesucian (purity), kebijaksanaan (wisdom), kejujuran (honesty), 
and cinta kasih (love).The term Maiyah was officially used in 
July 1998, especially right after the reform movement, when 
Cak Nun played important roles in convincing Suharto to 
resign, and in preventing wider riots in Jakarta and other cities. 
This included Yogyakarta, where he was one of the most vocal 
figures during the series of protests against the New Order 
regime. Maiyah, as Cak Nun has frequently asserted in different 
Maiyah gatherings, was initially a form of social and political 
critique from Cak Nun in response to what he considered 
‘pengkhianatan agenda reformasi’ (the violation of the reform 
agenda). In this context, the majority of Muslim intellectuals 
and prominent political leaders, including Cak Nun, were at 
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first engaged in the Indonesian reform processes and agreed to 
work together in establishing komite reformasi (a specific team 
of reform commissioners) for the preparation of the political 
transition after the resignation of Suharto. However, most of 
these leaders then found their own agenda of establishing their 
own political parties and organizations, and simply aimed to 
get the highest position in the new political arena. Cak Nun has 
often illustrated this concern with a dialogue between Gusdur 
and Soeharto:
Gusdur : Pak Harto, do you know that you’re really missed 
by most of Indonesian people?
Soeharto  :  Are you sure, Gus? How can you say so?
Gusdur :  When I try to see a current situation of my home-
town, Jombang, with a permission from Malaikat, 
I always find an interesting image of your smiling 
face in the backside of many trucks passing by my 
pondok pesantren with a specific saying: “Enak 
Jamanku tho?” (more comfortable during my era, 
isn’t it?) 
Soeharto :  So, do you agree with that Gus?
Gusdur :  Oh…of course Pak Harto. You know, during your 
era, you’re the only Soeharto. But now, everybody 
has become Soeharto. 
As a result, a new Indonesian democracy, based on its 
historicity and socio-cultural wisdom as imagined by Cak Nun 
and other ‘early figures of reform’ have never been discussed 
and manifested. In this context, the “American democratic style” 
(secular and capitalist system) has then taken for granted by 
the later reformist figures in affiliation with their own groups 
and political parties. Cak Nun considers that this “violation” 
of the reform goals, can also be interpreted as a violationof the 
core values of Pancasila, in which the first pillar is belief in God 
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in monotheistic terms, and other pillars are all connected. The 
only solution to treat and ‘medicate’ this violation, as Cak Nun 
has always emphasized and as is noted by Sumuranje (2013), 
was taqwa (God-fearing), through what Cak Nun called Cinta 
Segitiga Maiyah: melamar Syafaat Rosulullah (the triangle of 
love: proposing the blessings of the prophet). This is why he 
also refers to Maiyah as a form of gerakan ṣalawat (ṣalawat 
movement), simply suggesting that all human activities (politics, 
economics, religion, and socio-cultural issues) should be based 
on the spiritual values of God’s rule of law, through what has 
been exemplified by the prophet Muhammad. In local Javanese 
term, Cak Nun uses a phrase: 
“Maiyah is a training process of how we learn together, gon-
delan klambine Kanjeng Nabi (holding on the prophet’s vest-
ment” (Cak Nun, Mocopat Syafaat, October 2018). 
In putting forward the idea of transformation, a ṣalawat 
movement is then considered a mode of reminder, suggesting that 
the prophet has given a way of thinking that should be seriously 
learned by all Muslims, as the only way to reach God is through 
the prophet. Cak Nun himself, on many occasions, describes this 
Maiyah triangle of love can be applied to any issues in the world, 
including dealing with religious conflicts, violence, and other 
harsh situations. Interestingly, this principle can also be found 
in the work of American psychologist Sternberg (1988), The 
Triangle Theory of Love, suggesting that the love relationship 
should be based on three main components: intimacy (feelings of 
closeness, connectedness, and bondedness); passion (the drives 
that lead to physical attraction); and commitment (a decision 
that one loves a certain other and to maintain it). Maiyah, in 
some degrees, is all about applying this way of thinking. 
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Figure 2  
Maiyah Triangle of Love. Notes: “Maiyah Triangle of Love” (right), 
putting spirituality (God and the Prophet) as the main orientation of 
life (individual sovereignty is outside the world’s circles), instead of 
world’s materiality (left) that drives all life’s orientation (so that indi-
vidual sovereignty is under the control of world’s circles).
Source: caknun.com, 2018. 
Without a clear distinction between the roles and the 
depositions of the state (a nation state) and the government 
(political entities), what is being created for the future Indonesia, 
as Nadjib (2016) has assumed, is destruction, the ruin of the 
society. Therefore, in order to prevent the worst impacts and 
immediate destruction, Cak Nun initiated ṣalawat movement 
along with Kiakanjeng, a Gamelan fusion orchestra, a 
combination between Javanese traditional musical instruments 
and Western as well as Mediterranean musical instruments, as 
the main media of the ṣalawat movement. Using this approach, 
compared to other identical groups (Salafi, Tarbiyah, Jamaah 
Tabligh) and considering that Jamaah Maiyah is a relatively 
new group which has both features of sufism and social and 
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political activism at the same time, it has been successful in 
terms of pengajian lintas agama and lintas budaya (interfaith 
or inter-religious and cross culture dialogue), established after 
the reform era with participants from multi-religious and social 
backgrounds (Widiyanto 2016, 67), and has promoted different 
‘taste’ of Islam across the world during his international tour with 
Kiaikanjeng in many different countries. Maman (Pseudonym), a 
routine participant of Jamaah Maiyah gatherings in Yogyakarta, 
revealed:
“I feel comfortable with Maiyah community because it does 
not dictate me, it does not push me to behave or to do or not 
to do anything like ormas or other formal institutionalized or-
ganizations, but it does train me how to decide to do things.” 
(Interview with Maman, July 12, 2018). Currently, there are 
two different Maiyah forums: Maiyahan (a regular monthly 
gathering with Cak Nun or other activists within ‘internal’ 
Maiyah circles) and Sinau Bareng (gatherings with Cak Nun 
and Kiaikanjeng consists of religious preaching, discussion, 
workshop, and musical performance intended to wider audi-
ences across the country). The five main regular monthly Mai-
yah forums and Sinau Bareng usually gather thousands of par-
ticipants in each event. Since 2011, there have been more than 
70 ‘official’ Simpul Maiyah (Maiyah ‘branches’ nationally and 
internationally with a responsibility to have a coordination 
mechanism with Maiyah Kadipiro office in Yogyakarta) and 
hundreds Lingkar Maiyah (Maiyah smaller circles) that are es-
tablished indepedently throughout Indonesia and in many oth-
er countries. Interestingly, the name they use usually represents 
local knowledge and the spirit of looking for ‘local soveregnty’ 
by combining Islamic values and local cultural believes in de-
constructive ways, such as Obor Ilahi in Malang, Paseban Ma-
japahit in Mojokerto, Sanggar Kedirian in Kediri (East Java), 
Kidung Sayafaat in Salatiga, Sabamaiya in Wonosobo, Juguran 
Syafaat in Banyumas (Central Java), Jamparing Asih in Band-
ung, Lingkar Daulat Malaya in Tasikmalaya, Pameungkeut 
Asih in Subang (West Java), Ambengan in Lampung (Sumat-
era), Cangkir Syafaat in Central Kalimantan, Syafaat Batang 
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Banyu in South Kalimantan, Masuisani in Bali, Papperandang 
Ate in West Sulawesi, Tongil Qoryah in South Korea, Mafaza 
in Europe, and many other names. 
Table 2  
Jamaah Maiyah Main Gatherings




Every 15th of  
Javanese calendar
Started 1993




Every 25th/month Started 1999
Kenduri Cinta Jakarta










What is also interesting in terms of building a sense of 
security in the local community is that at almost all the events 
or performances by Kiaikanjeng that are at the invitation of the 
local community, there are a “triangle of security figures” on the 
stage (Cak Nun, the city mayor, and the chief of local police and 
the army commander) performing ṣalawat together. They claim 
that all the Maiyah events, usually running from 8 o’clock at 
night until 3 or 4 0’clock in the morning, do not require security 
forces because the security forces themselves prefer to join to the 
rhythm and the spiritual atmosphere they create together during 
the night’s events of music, dialogue, discussion, speech, jokes, 
poetry reading, drama, recitation of religious texts, and other 
syncretized religious-cultural ‘rituals’ based on a simple triangle 
concept of security Iman-Aman-Amin (faith-security-blessings). 
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Localizing Jihad, Globalizing Jimat
What does jihad mean? As the last two decades of global 
security discourses have seen wide ranging references of jihad, 
more specifically after the 9/11 tragedy which led to the 
overrepresented of such word in the Western news media, and 
in practice there has been so much use of the expressions of 
jihad in Islam’s political movements referring to a commitment 
to the spread of Islam through the ‘holy war’ or jihadist attacks, 
it is important to note that the interpretation of jihad is very 
diverse and should be seen in local contexts. Banser and Jamaah 
Maiyah, in this case, offer distinctive interpretations of jihad 
both in a discourse of nationalism and empirical engagement 
they perform within local, national, and global community. 
For Banser, the narrative of jihad has a high degree of its 
original meaning as ‘struggle’ or ‘striving’ of doing things in the 
way of God and even still has retained its religious and military 
association, but it is also having broader dimensions in their 
activism. It refers to the founding father of NU, KH Hasyim 
As’ari (April 10, 1875-July 25, 1947) who initiated and declared 
Jihād Fī Sabīlillāh Resolution 1945 during the Indonesian 
independence revolution against the Dutch colonial. This spirit, 
as it is then nationally commemorated as a Hari Santri Nasional 
(national santri day) by Presidential Decree signed by President 
Joko Widodo in 2015, finds its relevance in the period of the rise 
of terrorism, violent religious extremism, and massive efforts of 
‘khilafahism’ (establishing Islamic state) across the globe that 
are also utilizing the narrative of Islamic jihad. In the local 
Indonesian context, as khilafahism has many different features, 
what has been done by Banser and its affiliated organizations 
was pushing the state to close down any potentiality of religious 
movement that has a mission for establishing Islamic state. The 
banning of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) by the government 
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in 2017 was one accomplished missions through constitutional 
channels, but there are many other threats of underground 
movements threatening NKRI (the Indonesian state), Pancasila 
and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (the two main national doctrines) 
that KH Hasyim As’ari ordered younger generations of NU, 
including Banser to defend them using the spirit of NU’s Jihad 
resolution. 
This spirit is also manifested in the daily activities of Banser 
called ngepam (providing security provision) through eight main 
divisions as above mentioned. Based on my interview with Banser 
members, one of the main reasons why they are joining this 
group is that, Banser offers an opportunity to follow KH Hasyim 
As’ari’s pathway to do jihad and more importantly it gives a 
status of becoming santri of Mbah Hasyim even though they are 
not spending a period of time studying in pesantren (Indonesian 
Islamic traditional boarding school), as they do not have 
opportunity and capacity to do so. In this context, Kyai Hasyim 
Asy’ari, has been highly recognized with his clear ‘genealogy’ 
of Islamic knowledge and his contribution to synthesize Islam 
and nationalism within one breath. Therefore, following Mbah 
Hasyim also means following the prophet Muhammad, a strong 
believe among Banser members for securing a ‘ticket’ to Jannah 
(paradise), not only for them, but also for their families. One of 
the famous testaments from Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari which is used 
by all Nahdliyin (NU followers including Banser) as a source of 
inspiration or motivation for joining Banser is:
“Barang siapa yang mau mengurusi NU, saya anggap ia sant-
riku. Siapa yang jadi santriku, saya doakan khusnul khotimah 
beserta anak cucunya” (Whoever wants to take care of NU, 
I consider him to be my santri. For those who do so, I beg to 
God for their good life and for all of their next generations).
Heru (pseudonym), one of my informants from Surabaya, as 
he represents many other majority members of Banser who has 
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uncertain jobs, uncertain income for their families, and uncertain 
‘future’ of their children, once said: 
“Saya di Banser tidak mencari keuntungan, bangkrut iya, tapi 
sepisan aku golek sedulur sing akeh, pindo aku pengen ngu-
rangi dosa lewat berkahe pak Kyai, melu ngrasakke dadi san-
trine Mbah Hasyim. Aku pernah sakit nganti wis arep mati, 
diwacakke surat Yasin, ndilalah mari, sejak kuwi aku mandeg 
ngombe.” (“I am not looking for material benefits from Bans-
er, it’s indeed makes me bankrupt, but first I am looking for a 
brotherhood as many as possible, and secondly I want to atone 
for my sins through a blessing from kyai, having an experience 
of becoming santri of Mbah Hasyim. I had a near-fatal sick-
ness, but suddenly with the permission of God, I finally got 
recovered from it after I got healing prayers from kyai, and 
since then I promised to myself to stop drinking [alcohol]”). 
By using the narrative of Jihād Fī Sabīlillāh Resolution 1945, 
they build a personal as well as collective commitment to become 
santri (pupil or follower) of KH Hasyim. By doing so, considering 
the fact that the majority of Banser members are coming from 
lower social and economic status, joining the group offers them 
a bigger chance of getting higher hierarchy (upward mobility) in 
local social and religious standards. Through the calling of jihad, 
and the fact that the nature of Banser’s activities is based on 
the use of physical force, they usually protect themselves using 
specific physical training and for many members they equip their 
body and their belongings with what it is locally known as jimat 
(derived from Arabic word, azimah means strong firm or solid), a 
sacred thing (usually consists of Arabic handwritings) from Kyai 
or senior members and is believed to have a supranatural energy 
that can be used by the owners for many different purposes. 
In order to get a power and azimah, there are several steps 
should be followed since the early stage of recruitment process, 
where I also engaged with Banser’s Diklat Tingkat Dasar/DTD 
(the basic training) in Yogyakarta, they are not only trained with 
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a military-based training but are also provided with a ‘ritual’ of 
ijazah (a method of transferring power of invulnerability from 
Pak Kyai or local ulama to all new members). In doing so, those 
new members are asked to take off clothes (sometimes they are 
left fully naked in a specific place in the dark night, or replaced 
by a white uniform just like they perform Hajj in Mecca). Then, 
they are guided by ulama to line up like soldiers (either in a 
standing or sitting position), to close their eyes by holding hands 
to each other, to recite specific texts in Quran or Hadith for 
specific number of repetitions (usually in odd number) combined 
with Javanese ‘mantra’. 
At the end of the ritual, they call it with many different local 
terms, such as ilmu Al Haddid or Inti Besi (the iron core), Asma’ 
Wojo Tuwo (the “magic”of old iron), Susuk Loloh Baja, Susuk 
Loloh Gotri, Susuk Baja Gaib, Rujak Sewu, Aji Wojo Keramat, 
or any other name referring to the magic power of “sacred iron”. 
A pot of water which has been purified with specific mantra is 
a must, hundreds of telur ayam kampung (free-range chicken 
eggs), a basket of pipit bananas (a small size one), misik oil from 
the deer sweat), forest honey, a bottle of liquid mercury, and a 
bag of buckshot. Although these tools vary between regions, the 
method is quite uniform. Then, one by one, an “extreme show” 
must be followed. They are required to swallow the whole egg 
with its shell, or putting odd amounts of buckshot (from 3-77 
pieces depending on the braveness) on the chewed banana and 
then swallowed them together, or the lightest one is putting liquid 
mercury inside the whole banana and hen eat them together. The 
final step is a demonstration, started with the Kyai stabbing a 
sharp machete into his own arm, leg, stomach, and of course 
his neck. Several trainees are then asked to come forward trying 
the same simulation as they had seen from their master. The 
“magic” is real in their eyes, as nothing happened and all are 
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immune from the machete (and in the old era, they were also 
tested by a bullet fire). 
This aspiration, in fact, is not only echoed locally, but also 
manifested in national level. During my fieldwork, there was a 
massive nation-wide event of Kirab Satu Negeri (GP-Ansor’s 
One Nation Parade) in October 2018 (in which I engaged with 
this specific activity since the initial meeting in Jakarta to all the 
way from Surabaya to Yogyakarta). Started in September 16th 
from five different outermost areas of Indonesian state (Sabang 
in the western edge of Sumatra, Merauke in the most eastern 
part, Nunukan and Miangas in the northern most area, and 
Rote in the southernmost part), they tried to convince the public 
that the growing incidents of extremism, terrorism, radicalism, 
intolerance (including khilafahism) are just coming to the fore, 
and they encourage people to do real actions to prevent and to 
fight with them. All the way around the paramilitary parade of 
Banser was intended to promote what they call “menguatkan 
tali kebangsaaan” (tightening nationalism) through a slogan of 
“Banser-NU, Pancasila-Jaya, and NKRI Harga Mati”, as well as 
a way of explicitly irritating their opposing groups by showing 
a ‘parade of power’ and a commitment of contextualizing jihad 
into the a concrete form of a ‘statehood religiosity’.
This parade was also intended to the global audiences 
by hosting the 2nd Global Unity Forum3 in October 25-26 
in Yogyakarta. The two-days of international conference 
in collaboration with Bayt Arrahmah4 (a US based Sunni 
Islam organization) aimed to addressing the main topic of 
“Weaponization of Religion” as currently occurring in many 
different parts of the world. Attended by Muslim, Christian, 
Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish leaders from US, Europe, and Asia, 
3 This was the second forum after the first one held in Jakarta in 2016.
4 http://baytarrahmah.org
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they promoted to the world about the values and the practices 
of Islam Nusantara in Indonesia and resulted GP Ansor’s 
Declaration of Humanitarian Islam to build a global awareness 
and to stop the weaponization of religion for economic and 
political purposes. A document called “Seruan Nusantara” 
(Nusantara Statement) written in four different languages was 
signed by all of the participants, and it said:
“We call upon people of goodwill of very faith and nation to 
join in building a global consensus to prevent the political wea-
ponization of Islam, whether by Muslims or Non-Muslims, 
and to curtail the spread of communal hatred by fostering the 
emergence of a truly just and harmonious world order, found-
ed upon respect for equal rights and dignity of every human 
being”.
It was an optimistic aspiration to the global audiences 
concerning to what religious tolerance should look like and 
how to deal with that in practice at the grassroot level. As the 
campaign of Islam Nusantara are currently enlarged by hundreds 
of international branches of NU in many different countries 
through academic seminars, workshops, discussions, and 
cultural missions (such as musical performance held in Europe 
last year), and more specifically recruitment and regeneration 
process of Banser has been expanded internationally (in South 
Korea, Hongkong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and in the Netherland 
has been recommended by the last branch meeting of PCINU), 
it is clear that paramilitary troops of GP Ansor-Banser soon 
becoming a citizen of a “global village” promoting Indonesian 
version of moderate Islam. Interestingly, some Banser members I 
met in South Korea also believe in jimat, use it, and teach other 
members to have it.  
Jamaah Maiyah has different interpretation toward jihad. 
While the majority discourses of jihad is subjected to fight other 
opposing groups that are threatening, hostiling, or harming 
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through physical violence (even though other groups also use the 
narrative of jihad), Jamaah Maiyah take seriously to a position 
that the highest level of jihad is jihadunnafs (a ‘struggle’, a 
‘striving’, or a ‘war’ against the self). The narrative of “jabatan 
tertinggi adalah menjadi diri sendiri” (becoming yourself in 
the highest rank or position you can achieve). In this context, 
they believe that producing “new self” seriously is the ultimate 
goal in jihad because the self is the main agency who creates 
groups, social system and any other entities that are potentially 
conflicting each other when they face different interpretations 
and different interests. Within this paradigm, they call themselves 
as an organisme (organism) (instead of organisasi or Ormas-
social or religious organization) working based on the function 
and the natural law, and is not based on the structure and the 
state law (like Banser and other groups).
This vision cannot be separated with the fact that Jamaah 
Maiyah is growing after the reform movement, in which Cak Nun 
was one of the 9 tokoh reformasi (reform figures) who engaged 
the critical processes of democratic transition, and was initially 
intended to respond to the failure of cita-cita reformasi (the refom 
agenda). The imagined new democratic state, as it was proposed 
by several reform figures, has never been achieved because 
what happened after the reform movement was what they call 
“Soehartoization”, an authoritarian turn from centralized into 
decentralized corruption, and from reformasi into ref-Ormas-i. 
From this point of view, they come up to the idea that the main 
“enemies” and security threats for them and for the society are 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation within people’s way of 
thinking that caused mismanagement and misbehavior within 
individual and social structure in society. 
Accordingly, ndandani Indonesia (Javanese: ‘fixing’ Indone-
sia), for them, should be firstly based on correcting, repairing, 
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or adjusting the way of thinking. Security or insecurity, in this 
context, is only an impact or a result of what is driven by the 
way how people think. In their perspective, everybody should 
be aware of “the need for training” on how people think and 
act properly in the society. The state system and its political 
contestation (including the rise of Ormas after the reform), in 
this case, has failed to carry out this mandate. Maiyah movement, 
then, has been trying to address this gap through the first step of 
what they call tadabbur, meaning the thematic and contextual 
interpretation of religious texts either from the Quran and 
Hadith or any other religious resources (instead of using tafsir: 
interpretation of religious texts that is hard to be understood in 
the grassroots level). Maiyahan and Sinau Bareng, in this context, 
have been trying to create an enabling ‘training environment’ by 
rejecting any social and religious segregations (including gender 
and patron-client based social structure). The more often they 
do tadabbur and they share knowledge and experience among 
Jamaah Maiyah (through Maiyahan and Sinau Bareng consist 
of discussion, workshops, and thematic gatherings), the higher 
skill of understanding, tolerance, and problem solving they get. 
Arifudin (pseudonym), a Maiyah activist of Bangbangwetan in 
Surabaya gives an interesting point of view about tadabbur:
“…after a decade of studying in pesantren, I just understood 
the concept of tadabbur clearly in this forum (Maiyah forum), 
especially the analogy of tadabbur as Cak Nun illustrated, with 
‘dubur’ (rectum), suggesting that ‘what comes out is the prod-
uct of what enters’. it really deconstructs my understanding of 
the interpretation of religious texts which I have been wrongly 
understood” (Interview with Arifudin, December 6, 2018).
By doing so, after two decades of such intensive movements, 
there have been common discourses creating new individual 
and social sovereignty, new social system themselves that 
is not depending on the state support, Ormas, or any other 
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socio-religious institution, but based on Maiyah values they 
created. In terms of organization, they call kesadaran organisme 
Maiyah (literally consciousness of Maiyah organism) derived 
from Islamic Sufism and it consists of four main components: 
Dzat (substance), means the source of idea, knowledge, and 
vision; Sifat (trait or character), means those who manage and 
act as a ‘processor’ of the ideas, knowledge, and visions; Isim 
(intermediary), means the transformers; and Jasad (body), means 
the implementors, operators, or the executor of Maiyah values. 
In the organizational structure of Maiyah, these components are 
applied into four main categories based of functional purposes. 
In the highest position, there is Marja’ Maiyah (Maiyah 
references) consists of Cak Nun in Yogyakarta, Cak Fuad in 
East Java, and Syeikh Nursomad Kamba in Jakarta. Then, there 
are senior figures of Maiyah activists in Progress Management in 
Yogyakarta led by Toto Raharjo (the think tank) and Cak Zaky 
(Cak Nun’s brother, the manager) and it is responsible for all 
Cak Nun’s activities. In an equal position with Progress, there 
is Community Leader led by Sabrang Mowo Damar Panuluh 
(Cak Nun’s Son) as a result of national Maiyah meeting. Under 
community leader’s coordination, there are three different ‘team 
leaders’ who are in charge for strategic and planning issues, 
community coordination, and digital media communication. 
These team leaders are responsible for coordinating Maiyah 
activities which are divided into several regions and each region 
has at least one coordinator. 
Among Jamaah Maiyah, there have been familiar idioms 
of orang maiyah (the people of Maiyah), majlis masyarakat 
maiyah (maiyah community), pejalan Maiyah (Maiyah 
travelers), rumah Maiyah (house of Maiyah) simpul Maiyah 
(maiyah nodes), lingkar Maiyah (Maiyah circles), universitas 
Maiyah (Maiyah university), negeri Maiyah (Maiyah nation), 
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ijazah Maiyah (Maiyah ‘mantra’), Silatnas Maiyah (National 
conference of Maiyah) in which I engaged the last event last year 
in Surabaya with a very optimistic topic they call “Blueprint 
Peradaban Masa Depan” (Blueprint of the Future Civilization). 
They are currently also finalizing the draft of Piagam Maiyah 
(Maiyah charter, a concept adopted from Piagam Madinah 
(Charter of Medina, the Constitution of Medina which consists 
of 47 articles or clauses arranged by the people of Medina 
together with immigrants from Mecca shortly after the arrival 
of the prophet in 622 CE or the first year in Islamic calendar, 
with the supervision and consultation of the prophet). Most 
recently, in respond to the situation of national political 
polarization impacted by presidential election, they offer a new 
‘jimat Maiyah’ (azimah Maiyah) called Amar Maiyah (special 
prayers to prevent destruction) which massively performed by 
all Maiyah community across the country and globally. Within 
this new imagined community, a slogan of “Indonesia Bagian 
dari Desa Saya” (Indonesia is part of my village), a book written 
by Cak Nun in the early period of Padhangmbulan gathering 
(the first Maiyah forum), is realized, and it has currently been 
widely symbolized by peci Maiyah (Maiyah cap), a Sufi-like cap 
with red and white colors (similar with the color of Indonesian 
flag), the only ‘material culture’ representing Maiyah unity. 
Jimat (azimah) in Maiyah community is not based on a 
combination between spiritual and physical power different as 
what Banser has, but it is derived from a combination between 
love and spirituality. One of the many practices of getting jimat 
from Maiyah forums is what it is known as Suwuk in Javanese 
society. It is a common practice of traditional treatment method 
rooted from the old period of Javanese civilization using 
shaman’s mantras and different types of prayers based on 
the purposes which put in a glass of water. As it is commonly 
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used for the healing process of both physical and non-physical 
illnesses, in Maiyah community it is used for ngobati pikir lan 
ati (for the treatment of mind and soul). In order to get this, 
many people usually bring a bottle or two of mineral water 
to Maiyahan or Sinau Bareng. At the end of the event, there is 
always a long queue of people willing to shake hand with Cak 
Nun and other Maiyah figures in the stage, and those who aim 
to get suwuk from Cak Nun. And what Cak Nun say about 
this practice, he usually tell jamaah (the audiences): “it is not 
because of me, it is because you come here with love and with 
a full of submission to ask God to help you, and we ask Him 
and praise the prophet Muhammad together in order to grant 
all our prayers, so we believe that God will do so”. Interestingly, 
I also found this practice in the US, in Europe, Australia, South 
Korea, Egypt, and in many other countries wherever Cak Nun 
and other charismatic figures visit those countries and held a 
meeting with Indonesian communities. 
Like Banser’s aspiration of becoming santri of Mbah Hasyim 
has become a common reason for joining the group, it is also 
commonly expressed by Maiyah activists (as they are reluctant 
to be called Maiyah followers or the followers of Cak Nun), 
is becoming santri of Mbah Nun (Cak Nun). In this context, 
while Banser has a motive of experiencing the spirit of NU’s 
Jihad Resolution for defending the state, Jamaah Maiyah has an 
intention to feel some of the core values of Maiyah, as Cak Nun 
frequently says: 
“menjadi manusia ruang yang mampu menampung semua 
golongan” (becoming a man of ‘space’ who has an ability to 
accommodate all groups), or Islam itu kata kerja, bukan iden-
titas, sehingga outputnya adalah menyelamatkan orang lain 
(Islam is a verb, not an identity, so that the consequence is 
saving others), or “jika tidak bisa menjadi bagian dari solusi, 
minimal tidak menambah masalah di masyarakat, itulah prin-
sip hidup orang Maiyah” (if becoming part of the solution of 
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societal problems is impossible, then at least, not adding more 
problems, that is the life principle of Maiyah). 
In applying these principles, in Yogyakarta, for example, 
two Maiyah activists from NU and Muhammadiyah established 
Nahdlatul Muhammadiyin (NM), a study group led by a 
combination of both NU and Muhammadiyah local senior 
figures to bridge classical debates between the two groups about 
different interpretations and daily religious practices.These 
principles also applied by Cak Nun and Kiaikanjeng during 
their performances on the global arenas. In 2002, their tour to 
six Egyptian provinces performing a ‘gamelan version’ of the 
songs by Ummi Kultsum (a legendary Egyptian singer) was an 
eye opener for the Muslim communities in Egypt on how Islam, 
traditional music from Java, and Arabic song were harmonized 
by a group of people who do not speak Arabic at all. During the 
second tour to UK in 2005, Gordon Brown who made a speech 
expressed his amazed and said that “the diversity of nuances 
and the cohesion of global pluralism reflected by the pattern 
of arrangements and the sound of the music of Kiaikanjeng 
aptly picture the ideals we are fighting for and which we should 
achieve in the world of today and of tomorrow” (Betts 2016). 
In Italy 2005, even though almost all members of Kiaikanjeng 
have no official musical background (musical expertise through 
training) or higher academic background but use only their 
Maiyah spirit and loyalty to the values of ṣalawat, and they were 
called ‘Complimente, Complimente Maestro, Grazia Maestro!’5 
(Betts 2006). In 2008, they were also invited by the Protestant 
Church in The Netherlands for the intercultural and inter-
religious project of nine citis tour entitled Voices and Visions: An 
Indonesian Muslim Poet Sings a Multifaceted Society following 
5 A special recognition awarded by Classical musicians in Italy when Kiakanjeng 
performed in three different cities, including in Rome at the moment of the passing of 
the Pope John Paul II on April 2005. 
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the provocative film Fitna made by Geert Wilders. Other tours 
in Australia (2003, 2008), Scotland (2005), Germany (2005), 
Finland (2006), Malaysia (2005, 2007), Abu Dhabi (2008), 
Morocco (2013), and in other countries were not only reflected 
interreligious and intercultural dialogues but also brought people 
together to appreciate the differences in many dimensions of 
life and promoted mutual understanding among human being. 
This is how Cak Nun interprets Indonesian Bhineka Tinggal Ika 
(the state principle of ‘unity in diversity’) to be promoted to the 
world.
Concluding Remarks
The nature of ‘bottom-up governance’ developed and 
campaigned by Banser and Jamaah Maiyah, in which the one 
is shaped in a more practical way of political approach, and the 
other is denoted in a more aesthetical manner of socio-religious 
movement may shed light two different facets of theoretical 
and empirical shift toward social harmony within the era of 
insecurity and uncertainty in post-democratic transition. 
First, the discourses and the conceptual drivers they use, 
derived from both religious norms (the moment of hijrah of the 
prophet Muhammad and the interpretation of jihad in Islam), 
and local socio-cultural values (perceived imaginary of a nation-
state of Indonesia) aspire deconstructive perspectives toward 
hegemonic Western-centric way of thinking, knowledge, and 
discussions about global governance, nationhood or nationalism, 
democracy, and civil society. 
Second, the empirical, material, and practical conditions that 
navigate the production and reproduction of the local-national-
global imagining of community may also offer a new puzzle for 
re-imagining and re-understanding the mainstream traditions on 
how to maintain social cohesion and to create social order in 
society. 
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The role of non-state actors, based on the cases of Banser and 
Jamaah Maiyah, along with the unbelievable use of internet for 
a wide range of purposes in the digital age, and the utilization of 
social media as means for terrorist recruitment, violent religious 
indoctrination, and showcase of violence and extremism, 
referring to McChesney’s (2013) notion of ‘digital disconnect’ 
in understanding how capitalism is turning the internet against 
democracy, has reflected new shared social imaginaries. In this 
respect, as socio-religious movements performed by both Banser 
and Jamaah Maiyah are also introducing and envisioning new 
kinds of perspectives of the state, creating new consciousness of 
nationalism, and dealing with security provision, they clearly has 
blurred what Anderson (1983) calls as “imagined community”, 
more specifically with the premise he proposed that nationalism 
is built through two main channels: the ‘institutionalization of 
identity’ (involving the discussions of census, map, and museum 
as material artifacts for the production and reproduction of 
nations) and ‘print capitalism’ (using newspapers and novels as 
narrative structures for creating vernacular literatures). 
In a broader context, this has also compelled the tradition of 
scholar-activism to rethink about the death of print capitalism 
that is radically transformed the ways how people introduce new 
kinds of more complex narrative structures through different 
forms of language, literature, and national identity. Within this 
newly society arrangement, where there are no clear supreme 
exemplars of the infrastructure of national imaginaries, the 
institutionalization of identity is currently recognized, produced, 
reproduced, and reinforced  by new cultural constructions 
involving multi-actor and multi-interest parties, the contestation 
of politics of identity, the reinterpretation of the role of religion, 
and the remaining state-centered effort of governing society have 
intertwined a new form of imagined communities, that is ‘out 
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of the state’ governance dealing with on-the-ground problem 
solving throughout the global village. 
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